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Henry Leavenworth is an American hero. Over the course of his career, he was brevetted 
three times for gallantry in battle, and he served with distinction from the snowdrifts of Canada 
to the blistering plains of western Oklahoma. Henry was born in New Haven, Connecticut in 
1783 to Revolutionary War veteran, Colonel Jesse Leavenworth and his wife Catherine.1 After 
finishing primary school in Delaware County, New York, Leavenworth worked at a law office. 
Dedicated to success, he studied law while working there, and he was quickly admitted to the 
New York Bar. As a practicing lawyer, he became immensely popular throughout his county, yet 
he was destined for a different carrier.2 When the War of 1812 broke out, the 29 year old lawyer 
raised a company of volunteers from the area and was elected its captain.3 The company served 
under General Winfield Scott. Leavenworth’s intelligence and sound judgment earned him the 
rank of major less than a year later. During Winfield Scott’s famed victory at the battle of 
Chippewa, Leavenworth served with distinction, and earned the rank of lieutenant colonel.4 A 
short while later, his quick thinking and leadership at the battle of Lundy’s Lane played a major 
part in the American victory. He was brevetted to colonel, the rank at which he finished the war.5 
Thus, in less than three years, Henry Leavenworth rose from the rank of captain to colonel, a feat 
that typically takes twenty years in today’s military.  
Leavenworth’s career was just beginning. His charisma was captured in one soldiers’ first 
impression of him, “He entered our encampment and sallied from tent to tent, heartily shaking 
                                                          
1 William R. Nester, The Arikara War: The First Plains Indian War, 1823 (Missoula: Mountain Press Publishing 
Company, 2001), 153. 
2 Ibid. 
3 John W. Partin, A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth 1827-1983 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 
History, 1983), 13. 
4 Nester, 153. 
5 Ibid.  
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hands with many of his old friends whom he met, and bestowing a smile upon all around him.”6 
In this study, it will be proven that Henry Leavenworth’s highly interpersonal and innovative 
leadership style clearly distinguished him as one of the most accomplished commanders of the 
Early American West. 
 
 
Figure 1. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Leavenworth, c. 1820; The Arikara War. Notice 
Leavenworth’s confident professionalism and adherence to uniform standards. 
Source: William R. Nester, The Arikara War: The First Plains Indian War, 1823. 
The first true test of Colonel Henry Leavenworth on the frontier was the Arikara War.7 
During this conflict, the Colonel showed tremendous initiative in his response to challenges as 
well as a respect for Native American livelihood that was not typical on the frontier. His 
command decisions saved the lives of numerous American Soldiers and hundreds of Arikara 
civilians. Known as the first major conflict the United States had with a plains Native American 
                                                          
6 Anonymous, Dragoon Campaigns to the Rocky Mountains (New York: Wiley and Long, 1836), 105. 
7 Charles K Gardner, In A Dictionary of all Officers, Who have been Commissioned, Or have been Appointed and 
Served, in the Army of the United States (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1853), 272-273. 
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tribe, the Arikara War was short, bloody and controversial. The war was sparked when trappers 
of the Missouri Fur Company were attacked by Arikara, also called Rickaree or Ree, warriors 
when conducting a trading expedition along the Upper Missouri River in present day South 
Dakota.8 The Missouri Fur Company was founded by former Brigadier General William Henry 
Ashley, often called General Ashley. He led a brigade of young trappers known as “Ashley’s 
Hundred.”9 In the spring of 1823, Ashley set off up the Missouri with his 100 men with the goals 
of reaching the fur fortune that lay in the Rocky Mountains. Ashley hoped to establish a 
rendezvous system where trappers and Native Americans could bring out each year’s pelts to one 
massive trade gathering.10 When Ashley’s party reached South Dakota, he planned to trade with 
the Arikara Indians at their strategically placed village at a dominating point on the Missouri 
River. Ashley needed 40 to 50 horses to help assist with the last half of his journey. 11 The 
trading did not go as planned. 
The party arrived peacefully on May 30th, 1823, but trade went poorly. The Rees Chief, 
Grey Eyes, understood the value of Rees horses and knew they controlled the only substantial 
amount in the immediate area.12 Ashley secured only 19 horses, and those were at a steep price.13 
The night of June 1st, Ashley and the men spotted Rees warriors watching them from the woods. 
Suspicious, General Ashley doubled the men on the shore guarding the horses to 40 while the 
rest of the party slept on the boats. That night, two of his men, Edward Rose and Aaron 
                                                          
8 Roger L. Nichols, "Backdrop for Disaster: Causes of the Arikara War of 1823," South Dakota History 14, no. 2 
(1984): 93. 
9 Robert Willoughby, "The Arikara War of 1823: The Impact on Ashley's Fur Trade Operations on the Northern 
Plains" Heritage of the Great Plains 44, no. 2 (2012): 7. 
10 Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 214. 
11 Nichols, 94. 
12 Willoughby, 11. 
13 Nester, 140. 
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Stephens, disobeyed orders and snuck off to the village with the intention of finding female 
company. 14 Ashley recants what happened next in a letter printed in the Missouri Republican on 
June 24, 1823:  
The next morning, about half past 3 o’clock, I was informed that Aaron Stephens, one of my men, 
had been killed by the Indians, and that in all probability they would be attacked in a few 
minutes…At sunrise the Indians commenced a heavy and well directed fire from a line…about six 
hundred yards in length. Their aim was principally at the men on the shore.15 
The concealed Arikara warriors’ concentrated fire ripped through the men left on the open shore. 
Those who could, retreated to the boats. Less than 15 minutes after the initial shot, Ashley 
ordered the remaining Ashley men to retreat downstream. Spurred by his men, Ashley made the 
decision to withdraw back to an island out of Rees territory, and call for reinforcements.16 When 
his men reached Fort Atkinson and reported the attack, the US Army was ready to retaliate.  
  Colonel Henry Leavenworth swiftly took action. On June 18th, Ashley’s men reached 
Fort Atkinson, where Leavenworth commanded. Benjamin O’Fallon, the Indian agent at Fort 
Atkinson, responded to Ashley imminently with Leavenworth’s decision:  
Colonel Leavenworth and myself have consulted, and he has determined to lose no time in giving 
you relief, and punishing and putting if possible a final end to the repeated and most shocking out 
rages of the Arikaras. He is now preparing and setting out with the utmost dispatch an efficient 
force of upwards of 230 men.17 
Leavenworth hade made a historical command decision. Never had the United States Army 
moved out in such full force against an enemy on the Great Plains. Leavenworth understood that 
there had been repeated Native American attacks before, but if a plains tribe could attack such a 
large force of Americans unpunished, it could result in unrestricted raiding throughout the Upper 
                                                          
14 Willoughby, 11. 
15 William Henry Ashley, "Letter from William Ashley to a Gentleman in Franklin, Missouri, June 7, 1823" Missouri 
Republican, 1823. 
16 Nester, 147. 
17 Benjamin O’Fallon to William Ashley, June 20, 1823, in Dale Morgan, editor, The West of William H. Ashley 
(Denver: The Old West Publishing Company, 1964), 35. 
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Missouri. He showed tremendous daring, confidence and ability by ordering the response 
without first consulting his superiors. However, it proved clear that he made the correct decision, 
and his superiors responded well. General Edmund Gaines, Leavenworth’s superior, reported to 
Washington D.C. that he had “great confidence in the discretion and conduct of that officer, and 
[Gaines was] persuaded that the circumstances of the case justified the step which he has 
taken.”18 Having made his decision, Leavenworth prepared the six companies of his regiment, 
loaded his artillery on boats manned by Ashley’s men, and headed north on June 22, 1823, just 
four days after Ashley’s messengers and wounded arrived at Fort Atkinson.19 
 Leavenworth’s force, called the Missouri Legion, marched north with haste and arrived at 
the Lakota, or Sioux, village where Ashley had taken refuge on July 30th.20 The legion, along 
with Ashley’s men, surged up the river. On August 3rd, they came into contact with a Saone band 
of Hunkpapa. After exchanging gifts, the Sioux chiefs threw a huge feast. Leavenworth saw 
tremendous value in securing the Sioux as an ally because their light cavalry could match the 
Arikara’s speed. That night Major Pilcher, Leavenworth’s Indian agent, added them to the 
campaign as allies.21 On the 8th of August, Leavenworth halted his still undetected his forces 16 
miles south of the Arikara villages. The next morning he set out with his full force of 750 Lakota 
warriors, 50 fur trappers, his regiment of infantry and his artillery. By noon the next day, the 
Legion reached the Grand River, which flowed six miles downstream of the Rees’ villages. 
Fearful the Arikaras would flee their villages once his force was detected, Colonel Leavenworth 
sent forth his Lakota light cavalry, a company of infantry, and the trappers to engage the 
                                                          
18 Nester, 154. 
19Aaron Robert Woodard, "William Ashley and Jedediah Smith and the Arikara Battle of 1823," Journal of the 
West 51, no. 4 (2012): 80. 
20 Nester, 165.  
21 Ibid., 168. 
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enemy.22 Unfortunately, the undisciplined light cavalry charged ahead of the infantry. James 
Clyman, a mountain man, describes the scene he saw when the infantry and mountain men 
caught up with the Sioux horsemen:  
…the plain was covered with Indians which looked more like a swarm [of] bees than a battle 
field…the Rees having mounted and met the Sioux half a mile from their pickets…as soon as we 
came into sight the Rees retreated into their village.23  
Leavenworth recants a similar story. “The Ricaras maintained their ground, or rather drove the 
Sioux back, until the regular troops, and General Ashley’s men arrive, and formed a line. The 
Ricaras were then imminently driven into their town.”24 After the skirmish, Leavenworth had his 
full force ready to strike, with the exception of his cannon, which was struggling against head 
winds on the river in the keel boats. He made the decision to pause the attack until the next 
morning. He understood that the enemy was encircled and tired, and they would be hard pressed 
to escape with their women, children and possessions, but standard military doctrine of the day 
demanded that an infantry assault be proceeded with an artillery barrage if possible. Most 
importantly, his men had just endured a 15 mile trek in the summer heat and were fatigued.25 
Leavenworth ensured that the enemy was properly surrounded and then ordered his men to rest 
up for a morning assault.  
 On the morning of August 10th, Leavenworth proceeded the storming of the Arikara 
village with a deadly artillery barrage.26 The village was split into two sections: a lower village 
and an upper village. Leavenworth shelled both. The both sections of the village appeared 
                                                          
22 William Ashley, The West of William H. Ashley, Dale Morgan, editor, 53. 
23 James Clyman, “Journal of James Clyman,” August 8th 1823, in Dale Morgan, editor, The West of William H. 
Ashley, 53. 
24 Nester, 170. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ashley, 53. 
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relatively undamaged and many Indians hid in the safety of their cellars.  However, the Arikara 
chief Grey Eyes, who had been the largest supporter of conflict with Americans, was killed by an 
early shot.27 Leavenworth ordered Ashley to launch a diversionary attack to gain a strategic 
ravine just below the lower village while a rifle company assaulted the upper village. Both units 
moved successfully into position; hammers ready to strike the anvil.28 
It was at this critical moment that Colonel Leavenworth hesitated. Leavenworth did not 
realize that the barrage had broken the morale of the Arikara, almost all of whom had never 
experienced an artillery barrage. Also, only a portion of the Arikara supported the war, and with 
their leader Grey Eyes dead, they faltered in their courage. Leavenworth saw his attack as an all-
out gamble with potential to either destroy his force or “annihilate an entire tribe too defiant to 
surrender.”29 Unwilling to roll the dice, he ordered his men to withdraw to their original 
positions. Only two men under Leavenworth’s command had been wounded during the 
engagement; conversely the Arikara death toll was estimated at roughly 50 warriors.30 A few 
hours later, a lone chief rode out of the village to parlay. Leavenworth rode out with Joshua 
Pilcher, his Indian Agent, to meet him.31 
 The Arikara Chief, Little Soldier, explained that Grey Eyes had instigated the original 
attack and pleaded with Leavenworth for peace. Leavenworth had Little Soldier go back to the 
village and return with the other chiefs. While Little Soldier was gone, Pilcher demanded that the 
peace talks be stopped. He argued, “nothing short of a drastic resolution of the present difficulty 
                                                          
27 Nester, 172. 
28 Willoughby, 15. 
29 Nester, 174. 
30 Henry Leavenworth to the Secretary of War, “Official Report”, August 15, 1823, in Dale Morgan, editor, The 
West of William H. Ashley, 56. 
31 Brad Tennant, "The Arikara: Roadblock to the American Fur Trade on the Northern Great Plains" Heritage of the 
Great Plains 44, no. 2 (2012): 29. 
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would convince the tribes of the Upper Missouri of the power of the United States.”32 
Leavenworth dismissed his advice. Together with General Ashley, they reached a treaty and 
smoked a peace pipe. The treaty bound the Arikaras to restore Ashley: any horses that they 
could, all of the guns, and all of the property they took, as well as to not obstruct the navigation 
of the Missouri, treat all American citizens with kindness and civility, and to punish anyone who 
commits acts of violence upon any American Citizen.33 Leavenworth also gave them a warning 
which he recounts in a report to his commanding officer: 
I addressed them…they had seen but a small specimen of the power of the Americans-That they 
were in our power, but we did not wish to hurt them if they behaved well…the wish (of the 
Americans was) to be at peace with all the red skins… (but) should they behave badly…expect to 
be more severely punished.34 
After the treaty was signed, the situation became muddy. The peace infuriated the Sioux 
and many of Ashley’s men who wanted to ransack Arikara. That night the Sioux withdrew back 
to their own territory.35 The Arikara did not produce the quantity of goods promised to Ashley 
which, had the potential to lead to conflict. That evening, the Arikara, frightened by the threat of 
further American attacks, slipped by Leavenworth’s sentries and vanished. The next morning, 
Leavenworth sent riders after them, urging them to return and warning that without their 
presence, their village could be burned by “bad men and bad Indians.”36 However, the Arikara 
did not return. On August 15th, without the Arikara present and no reason to stay, the Missouri 
Legion crammed on the Keel boats and rode the river back down south. Shortly after departing, 
they saw pillars of smoke from the village and stopped. They returned and found that it had been 
                                                          
32 Nester, 174. 
33 Henry Leavenworth to the Secretary of War, “Official Report”, August 15, 1823, in Dale Morgan, editor, The 
West of William H. Ashley, 54. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Nester, 174. 
36 Henry Leavenworth to the Secretary of War, “Official Report”, August 15, 1823, in Dale Morgan, editor, The 
West of William H. Ashley, 55. 
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razed by two of Pilcher’s men. This infuriated Leavenworth, who blamed Pilcher. Yet without 
further proof, Leavenworth could do nothing to Pilcher. The Legion once again set off to Fort 
Atkinson, where Leavenworth would fight another battle, this time in the press, to save his 
reputation.  
 The way Leavenworth handled the Arikara set the newspapers ablaze with accusations of 
his inability as an officer and editorials by starch defenders of his actions. The Indian Agents, 
Pilcher and O’Fallon, participants in the fur industry, and some of Ashley’s Hundred all favored 
a near annihilation of the Arikaras as a show of American military might to all Plains Tribes.37 
McDonald, Pilcher’s friend who set the Arikara village ablaze, blasted Leavenworth’s mercy in 
The Washington Gazette. “..my house and trading establishments were within sixty miles of the 
Arickara towns…the vengeance of the Arickaras, exasperated by the inefficient attack upon 
them…exposed [me] to the remorseless ferocity of the whole tribe.” 38 Pilcher, in a letter 
reviewing Leavenworth’s conduct commented, “your operations have...[left the Indians] the 
greatest possible contempt for the American character.” Leavenworth was quick to defend 
himself. In his report of the engagement he both justifies his actions and places the blame for any 
future Arikara attacks onto McDonald: 
I felt confident that the Indians had been sufficiently humbled “fully to convince them of our 
ability to punish any injury they might do us,” and that they would behave in the future, if we left 
them undisturbed in their villages: Gen. Ashley’s boats then, I had no doubt, proceed without 
molestation, to the mouth of the Yellow Stone river… I also felt satisfied that the blood of our 
countrymen had been avenged.39 
                                                          
37 Nester, 184. 
38 McDonald to the Washington Gazette, September 13, 1824, in Dale Morgan, editor, The West of William H. 
Ashley, 56. 
39 Henry Leavenworth to the Secretary of War, “Official Report”, August 15, 1823, in Dale Morgan, editor, The 
West of William H. Ashley, 58. 
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Leavenworth’s decision to show leniency was further supported by many in the military 
community. General Gaines, in a letter to the Secretary of War Calhoun stated, “The victory 
most acceptable to an enlightened and virtuous nation is, doubtless, that which is obtained at the 
least expense of blood.”40 McDonald was incorrect in his evaluation of the Arikaras’ attitude 
towards Americans. The surviving Arikara wandered the plains until they eventually settled in 
present day North Dakota, where the tribe still resides. The Arikara, with the exception of a few 
rogue bands, never again took up arms against Americans. A company of Arikara scouts even 
rode with Custer to Little Bighorn.41 The record is clear: Leavenworth reacted to an attack on 
Americans swiftly and with minimal casualties; after achieving victory, he chose to show mercy 
rather than destroy the Arikara. His actions won him the favor of his superiors, which led them to 
later trust him for critical missions.   
 Colonel Leavenworth’s next notable success came in 1826. As the United States 
expanded West, a notable hole in the western frontier developed. A large stretch of the Missouri 
River was defended only by Fort Osage that lay far in north, and Jefferson Barracks, in St. Louis, 
which was much too far east to effectively guard western Missouri. When the people of 
Missouri, joined by the merchants of the Santé Fe Trail, pressed Congress for better military 
protection along the Missouri River, Congress took action.42 The Federal Government assigned 
the United States Army to build a fort to meet these needs, and Henry Leavenworth was assigned 
to plug the gap in the line. In March of 1827, Henry Leavenworth received orders to “ascend the 
Missouri…to choose a location on the left bank of the river, twenty miles above or below the 
                                                          
40 Nester, 186. 
41 Ibid., 212. 
42 J. Patrick Hughes, Fort Leavenworth Gateway to the West (Topeka: Kansas State Historical Society, 2000), 1. 
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point where the Little Platte River entered it, as a site for a permanent cantonment.”43  He set out 
with four companies of the Sixth Infantry Regiment. When he arrived on the left bank of the 
river, which marked the western edge of Missouri, he soon realized there was no suitable site for 
a base.44 The topography was poor. The low river banks were susceptible to flooding and poor 
for agriculture. If the Missouri flooded, it would be difficult for him to assist or control those 
who were trading or caravanning in Indian Territory. Recognizing these adversities, he made the 
innovative decision to cross the river to find a more favorable location.45  
He found a ridge of bluffs that sat high above the river, roughly 100-150 feet. The highest 
point of the area, it naturally commanded both the surrounding plains and the mighty Missouri. 
Leavenworth knew because of their elevation, the bluffs were easily defendable, and provided an 
excellent vantage point of the area. The river was also relatively narrow at this point, roughly 
300 feet.46 This would make transporting personnel, animals, and equipment significantly easier. 
Many frontier forts had to be self-sufficient due to their extended position from other 
Americans.47 The location of the bluffs also offered a wide swath of potential farmland to the 
southwest that could be easily cultivated. Perhaps most importantly, the location was on the same 
side of the river as the Santé Fe trail, which would allow the base to act as both a gateway to the 
southwest and to react to any future conflicts much more quickly. Recognizing the benefits of the 
western bank, Leavenworth disregarded the specifics of his orders, and on May 8th, 1827 planted 
                                                          
43 Maynard Downes, History of Fort Leavenworth while a Frontier Post (Madison: Library of the University of 
Wisconsin, 1913), 4. 
44Elvid Hunt and Edward Leonard King. History of Fort Leavenworth 1827-1927 (Fort Leavenworth: The General 
Service Schools Press, 1926), 20. 
45 George H Walton, Sentinel of the Plains: Fort Leavenworth and the American West (Englewood Cliff: Prentice-
Hall 1973), 13. 
46 Downes, 4. 
47 Nester, 162. 
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his flag officially establishing Cantonment Leavenworth.48 By doing so, he established the first 
permanent American settlement in present day Kansas. Picking the perfect location was crucial, 
but ensuring that the cantonment was successful was just as challenging.  
 In the spring of 1828, Leavenworth took a number of steps to ensure that Cantonment 
Leavenworth succeeded as an effective frontier post. Congress did not allocate money for 
supplies, so Leavenworth petitioned the Quartermaster Department of the Army and received 
supplies to erect humble structures.49 He also put the soldiers to work planting crops to be 
harvested in the fall. They also recruited Osage and other Native Americans to help hunt 
buffalo.50 A post office was established to ensure timely and consistent communication with the 
general population and military administration. This would be the only post office in present day 
Kansas until 1843 when an office was established at Fort Scott.51 The post office instantly made 
the fort the regional hub for everyone in the area. It gave settlers, soldiers, and traders a 
destination. Later, when the area became more populated, settlers traveling to the base to check 
for mail would purchase goods from the general store, and come to rely on the base as a primary 
social system. To assist with the mail, supply issues, and connect the base with the rest of 
America, Leavenworth had a ferry established at the Platte falls, near where the Little Platte 
River met the Missouri. The ferry ran from Cantonment Leavenworth to the quickly booming 
riverside town of Liberty, Missouri, some 35 miles to the south.52  
                                                          
48 Hughes, 3. 
49 Downes, 7. 
50 R. B. Mason, "Feats in the West," American Turf Register and Sporting Magazine, (1835). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Downes, 8. 
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In the spring of 1829, four companies of the Sixth Infantry Regiment successfully 
accompanied a twenty-five wagon caravan along the Santé Fe Trail to the border of Mexico. This 
marked the first of many voyages across the Great Plains that passed through the portal of 
Cantonment Leavenworth. It also marked a historic shift away from St. Louis and the protection 
of Jefferson Barracks, which had traditionally served as the starting point for explorations west.53 
St. Louis was still the staging point to gather supplies and served as the headquarters for many 
companies, but Cantonment Leavenworth became the filter through which people entered and 
exited Indian Territory, which attracted the administrators tasked with managing the lands west 
of the Missouri. The base was off to a quick start. 
John Dougherty, of the Council Bluffs Indian Agency, noticed Leavenworth’s success in 
rapidly expanding the base. He decided that Cantonment Leavenworth was a more effective 
location for an agency and began operating out of the base.54 The agency at Cantonment 
Leavenworth was entrusted with ensuring positive relations with the Ottoe, Pawnee, Maha, 
Ponea, other tribes of the Upper Missouri. It also managed the tribes of the imminent area 
including the Delawares, Kickapoo, and along the Kansas River: the Kanza. Major General 
Gaines also saw the value of the cantonment and placed one of only five Indian Department 
Superintendents there, with the task of managing every Indian Agent along the Missouri River 
and all of its dependent streams.55 With both the superintendent and an Indian Agency, 
Cantonment Leavenworth became a licensing and administrative hub for trappers and traders 
heading west.56  
                                                          
53 "Expedition to the Pacific" The Missouri Gazette, (1813). 
54 Downes, 32. 
55 Ibid., 33. 
56 Hiram Martin Chittenden and Stallo Vinton, The American Fur Trade of the Far West (New York: Press of the 
pioneers, Inc., 1935), 623.  
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The increased contact with Americans proved deadly for many of the Plains Indians 
tribes. On May 11th, 1832 the Christian Advocate and Journal and Zion's Herald featured an 
article that noted, “I wish I was capable of describing to you, in its true colors, even half the 
wretchedness which I witnessed during the few days I spent with the Pawnees…They were 
estimated at 10,000 souls…they have lost nearly half their number.”57 The agency did spare 
many of the Native Americans from Small Pox. The Otoe, who had been fully vaccinated, only 
suffered three fatalities when exposed to the same strain of the disease.58 Leavenworth’s expert 
placement of the Cantonment Leavenworth at its commanding position of the west side of the 
Missouri River, linked with his rapid steps to expand the base quickly made it a major central 
hub for entrepreneurs, military operations and Indian Agents. Colonel Leavenworth’s success 
helped further his career, making him the prime candidate for a historic expedition west. 
In 1833, Congress and the United States Military organized what would become the most 
lethal unit in their arsenal: cavalry. The newly promoted Brigadier General Henry Leavenworth 
was chosen to lead the newly formed cavalry on largest military expedition of the year.59 The 
cavalry, formally called dragoons because of the tactic of dismounting to fight, were crisply 
armed with a sword, pistol, and the most modern weaponry of the day: a carbine. The carbine 
was able to fire cartridges, and it reloaded with a simple caulking motion. It allowed for a much 
faster rate of fire than a rifle, was much more accurate than a musket, and only weighed seven 
and a half pounds, making it perfect for long travel.60 In 1834, the United States Government 
needed to establish a presence in the Southern Plains due to a number of Native American 
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58 Ibid. 
59 S. C. Stambaugh, "Expedition of the Dragoons to the West," Niles Weekly Register, (1834). 
60 "United States Dragoons," Niles Weekly Register 89, no. 389, (August 2, 1834). 
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conflicts and no formal treaties with the tribes responsible. Congress, eager to test their newly 
formed unit, slated the 1st Dragoons for the exhibition. The Niles Weekly Register printed the 
reasoning for the expedition on August 2, 1834: 
The object of the expedition is to give the wild Indians some idea of our power, and to endeavor, 
under such an imposing oree, to enter into conferences with them, to warn those Indians who have 
been in the habit of robbing and murdering our people who trade among them, of the dangers to 
which they will be exposed in case they continue their depredations and massacres.61 
Specifically, the goal of the mission was to make contact and establish a treaty with the powerful 
Pawnee and Comanche tribes. The soldiers were also to demand the return of an American boy, 
James Martin, who had been kidnapped while buffalo hunting with his father, a judge who died 
in the attack.62 The dragoon companies headed south and linked up in present day Oklahoma.  
On July 20th 1834, Leavenworth set out from Fort Gibson with the full regiment of 500 
dragoons.63 He had many Native Americans with him: Cherokees, Delawares, Comanche, Osage, 
and Pawnee, all to serve as interpreters and guides.64 His destination, 200 miles to the west, 
across the Cross Timbers region, was the False Washita River. The route took them through the 
friendly territory of the “half-civilized” Creek, Cherokee, and Osage tribes.65 Possibly because of 
the size of their force, but also because of the peaceful nature of the tribes, the Dragoons made 
peaceful contact with many small villages. The Cross Timbers region, a strip of land that runs 
from North Texas to Southern Kansas, is notoriously difficult terrain. In addition to the summer 
heat and hard labor, the regiment fell gravely ill. One man noted: 
                                                          
61 Ibid. 
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What the regiment of dragoons has suffered from sickness…is unexplained in the country and 
almost incredible…A great many died…The disease seems to be entirely of a bilious nature, and 
contracted by exposure to the sun, and the impurity of the water which…we were obliged to use.66 
Those who fell sick while close to Fort Gibson, OK were sent back. To make matters worse, 
Leavenworth himself became ill from a broken bone injury after his horse tripped while hunting 
buffalo. The expedition straggled to the False Washita River. It was there that Leavenworth had 
to make a crucial command decision. He could push forward, complete the mission, but risk even 
heavier losses, or he could turn back, leave the Martin boy, and fail to make contact with the 
Pawnee or Comanche. He made the intelligent decision to find the middle ground by splitting 
and reorganizing his forces.67 He set up a camp for the sick on the edge of the False Washita, 
where he and 232 others stayed.68 He sent 252 men forward, split into six companies, under the 
command of Colonel Dodge.69 The six companies left camp on the 12th of July, successfully 
pushed on and made contact with both the Pawnee and Comanche. Dodge started his meeting 
with the Pawnees by saying, “We meet you as friends, not enemies, to make peace with you…”70 
He made treaties with both and secured the release of the Martin boy.71 
Leavenworth, however was not so lucky, as his fever worsened. On July 21st, 1834, he 
passed away.72 Upon hearing the news, one of his soldiers wrote, “This piece of intelligence cast 
a gloom over the regiment…he was a man universally beloved by those under his command.”73 
Colonel Dodge collected Leavenworth’s body and the men at False Washita and safely returned 
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71 Dragoon Campaigns to the Rocky Mountains, 166. 
72 Brackett, 36. 
73 Dragoon Campaigns to the Rocky Mountains, 181. 
18 
 
 
to Fort Gibson on August 15th, 1834. Of the 500 men who set out, 151 did not return.74 The 
sickness that struck the regiment was unpredictable and unforeseeable. Leavenworth’s crucial 
decision to split his forces lead to a salvaging of what could have been a disastrous mission.75  
 Leavenworth was a successful commander in his time, but the legacy that he left in his 
wake would affect the American military for decades to come. The Arikara War is considered to 
be the first major conflict with a Great Plains tribe. The engagement was studied and examined 
for years to come and the command decisions Leavenworth made were supported by the military 
community.76 Things could have gone much worse. His caution led to almost no causalities of 
American regulars, a quality that Custer did not show at the Battle of Little Big Horn years later. 
His mercy lead to the survival of the Arikara people, instead of indiscriminate killing like what 
was seen during the Wounded Knee Massacre. Leavenworth’s expert placement and 
development of Fort Leavenworth helped it grow. It is one of few frontier forts that stood the test 
of time. Today Fort Leavenworth is known as the “Brain of the Army” and is home to the 
Command and General Staff College.77 Perhaps his largest legacy was the United States Cavalry 
itself. The dragoon expedition was the American people’s litmus test of cavalry, and had it been 
unsuccessful, the next 60 years of plains warfare might have looked drastically different.78 
Instead, his protégé, Colonel Henry Dodge, would drastically develop and expand the role of 
cavalry on the plains. Henry Leavenworth achieved a great deal in his life, from his success in 
the War of 1812 to becoming a dominant force on the plains, but what truly makes him great is 
the way he touched the his solders lives. Shortly before his death he was described as, 
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“combining most happily the dignity of the commander with the moderation and humanity of the 
Christian, and the modest urbane deportment of the scholar and gentleman; all love him, for all 
have access to him, and none that know him can help but love him.79 Let us remember Henry 
Leavenworth as his soldiers did. 
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